How would possibly the blitzkrieg of the long run arrive? By air strike? An invading military? In a terrorist's suitcase? In fact it might be coming down the line to a pc close to you. Operation Locked Shields, an international navy train held last month, was not exactly your ordinary sport of troopers. It involves no loud bangs or bullets, no tanks, aircraft or camouflage face-paint. Its troops rarely even left their control room, deep within a excessive security navy base in Estonia. These individuals symbolize a new form of combatant - the cyber warrior. One workforce of IT specialists collaborating in Locked Shields, had been detailed to attack 9 other teams, located throughout Europe. At their terminals in the Nato Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, they cooked up viruses, worms, Trojan Horses and other web attacks, to hijack and extract data from the computer systems of their pretend enemies. The thought was to be taught worthwhile classes in the way to forestall such assaults on navy and commercial networks. The cyber menace is one which the Western alliance is taking critically. It's no coincidence that Nato established its defence centre in Estonia. In 2007, the nation's banking, media and authorities websites had been bombarded with Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks over a 3 week period, in what's since grow to be referred to as Web War I. The culprits are thought to have been professional-Russian hacktivists, angered by the elimination of a Soviet-period statue from the centre of the capital, Tallinn. DDOS attacks are fairly simple. Networks of thousands of infected computer systems, often called botnets, simultaneously entry the target website, which is overwhelmed by the quantity of site visitors, and so briefly disabled. However, DDOS assaults are a mere blunderbuss by comparison with the most recent digital weapons. Today, the concern is that Web War II - if and when it comes - may inflict bodily injury, resulting in massive disruption and even dying. Richard A Clarke, an adviser on counter-terrorism and cyber-security to presidents Clinton and Bush. Clarke's worries are fuelled by the current tendency to put extra of our lives online, and indeed, they seem like borne out by experiments carried out in the United States. At the guts of the problem are the interfaces between the digital and bodily worlds generally known as Scada - or Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition - methods. Today, these computerised controllers have taken over a myriad jobs once carried out manually. They do all the things from opening the valves on pipelines to monitoring site visitors alerts. Soon, they're going to change into commonplace in the house, controlling smart appliances like central heating. And crucially, they use cyberspace to speak with their masters, taking commands on what to do subsequent, and reporting any issues back. Hack into these networks, and in concept you have control of national electricity grids, water provides, distribution techniques for manufacturers or supermarkets, and other crucial infrastructure. In 2007, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) demonstrated the potential vulnerability of Scada techniques. Using malicious software program to feed in the fallacious commands, they attacked a big diesel generator. Film of the experiment exhibits the machine shaking violently earlier than black smoke engulfs the display screen. Although this happened beneath laboratory circumstances, with the attackers given free rein to do their worst, the concern is that, someday, a belligerent state, terrorists, and even recreational hackers, might do the identical in the real world. Jenny Mena of the DHS. One purpose why Scada techniques could also be liable to hacking is that engineers, moderately than specialist programmers, are often likely to have designed their software program. They are knowledgeable of their area, says German security marketing consultant Ralph Langner, however not in cyber defence. Moreover, critical infrastructure software program will be surprisingly uncovered. A power station, for example, may need much less anti-virus protection than the typical laptop computer. And when vulnerabilities are detected, it can be not possible to restore them instantly with a software patch. Langner factors out. "And a energy plant has to run 24-7, with only a yearly power-down for maintenance." So until the ability station has its annual stoppage, new software can't be put in. Langner is well-qualified to comment. In 2010 he, together with two employees, took it upon himself to investigate a mystery laptop worm referred to as Stuxnet, that was puzzling the big anti-virus firms. What he found took his breath away. Stuxnet appeared to focus on a specific type of Scada system doing a specific job, and it did little harm to another purposes it infected. It was clever enough to search out its means from laptop to computer, searching out its prey. And, containing over 15,000 strains of computer code, it exploited no fewer than 4 previously undiscovered software errors in Microsoft Windows. Such errors are extremely rare, suggesting that Stuxnet's creators had been highly skilled and really well-resourced. It took Langner some six months to probe only a quarter of the virus. But his research had already drawn startling results. Stuxnet's goal, it turned out, was the system controlling uranium centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility. There is now widespread speculation that the assault was the work of American or Israeli agents, or both. Whatever the truth, Langner estimates that it delayed Iran's nuclear venture by round two years - no lower than any air strike was anticipated to attain - at a comparatively small cost of round $10 million. This success, he says, means cyber weapons are here to stay. Optimists say Stuxnet does at the least suggest a scrap of reassurance. Professor Peter Sommer, a global skilled in cyber crime, factors out that the amount of analysis and extremely skilled programming it involved would put weapons of this calibre beyond anyone but an advanced nation state. And states, he point out, usually behave rationally, thus ruling out indiscriminate assaults on civilian targets. But even this crumb of consolation is denied by Langner, who argues that, having now infected computer systems worldwide, Stuxnet's code is out there to anyone clever sufficient to adapt it, together with terrorists. One factor is for sure, he adds: If cyber weapons do turn into widespread, their targets will lie principally in the west, somewhat than in international locations like Iran, which have comparatively little internet dependence. Which means that the outdated guidelines of army deterrence which favoured highly effective, technologically superior nations just like the United States don't apply: Responding in type to a cyber assault could be effectively not possible. This asymmetry is prone to grow, as developed nations turn out to be ever more internet-dependent. To this point, the Internet Protocol format allows only 4.3 billion IP addresses, most of which have now been used. But this year, a new version is rolling out, providing an inexhaustible provide of addresses and so permitting exponential progress in connectivity. Expect to see far more machines than people online sooner or later. In the home, fridges will mechanically replenish themselves by speaking to food suppliers; ovens and heating methods will respond to commands from your smartphone. Cars might even drive themselves, sharing GPS knowledge to seek out the perfect routes. For industry, commerce and infrastructure, there will likely be much more reliance on cyber networks that critics claim are probably susceptible to intrusion. In actual fact, it has already turn into a problem for even delicate installations, let alone households, to stay offline. Although army and other vital networks are supposedly isolated from the general public web, attackers can target their contractors and suppliers, who plug into the "air-gapped" system at varied instances. Somewhere down the food chain, a weak webpage or a rogue e-mail will present a method in. In accordance with Richard Clarke, the mighty American armed forces themselves will not be immune, since their command & control, provides, and even some weapons programs, also depend on digital systems. The answer it seems is no. A brand new type of weapon seems to be emerging. And the world could need to study to adapt. The primary episode of the three part documentary series Danger in the Download offered by Ed Butler will likely be broadcast on BBC World Service on Tuesday 1 May at 00:06GMT and can be available afterwards on i-participant. Facing up to risk of cyberwar. The BBC will not be liable for the content material of exterior websites.